Over most of the last fi ve years, infl ation as measured by the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) has been less than 2 percent. Many forecasters during this time expected that infl ation would turn up, only to be repeatedly surprised. Recent forecasts from professional economists again have infl ation rising to 2 percent over the next two to three years. What is the likelihood that such a forecast will come to pass?
To answer this question, this Commentary examines the infl ation forecasts coming from a range of statistical models that historically have performed well in forecasting infl ation, and it shows both the point forecasts and the densities, or probabilities, around those forecasts.
In fi ve of the six models we consider, the probability that infl ation will be at least 2 percent over the next three years is less than 50 percent. Specifi cally, the estimated likelihood that PCE infl ation will be at least 2 percent ranges from 11 percent to 49 percent by the end of 2017, 16 percent to 51 percent by the end of 2018, and 18 percent to 49 percent by the end of 2019. These results vary widely, but because all six models demonstrate comparable historical forecasting accuracy, we cannot adjudicate between these competing models and forecasts.
Recent Infl ation Data and Forecasts
Infl ation as measured by the PCE has averaged 1.4 percent on a trailing four-quarter basis since the recovery began in 2009:Q3-0.6 percentage points below the Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) long-run objective of 2 percent. By comparison, over the 10-year period preceding the fi nancial crisis, PCE infl ation averaged 2.0 percent (see fi gure 1). Meanwhile, infl ation excluding food and energy (core PCE) averaged 1.5 percent and 1.8 percent over the same periods, respectively.
Not only has PCE infl ation been below 2 percent for most of the recent past, it has also persistently come in below many economists' forecasts. For example, in 2013:Q1, the median forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) was 2.0 percent for 2014:Q4 and 2015:Q4, whereas actual infl ation turned out to be 1.2 percent and 0.4 percent, respectively. Similarly, the median forecast for core infl ation was 1.9 percent for both 2014 and 2015, while actual core infl ation was 1.6 percent and 1.4 percent, respectively. Projections made by FOMC participants around the same time display similar forecast misses.
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This Commentary examines infl ation forecasts generated from a range of statistical models that historically have performed well at forecasting infl ation. For each model, we look at the most likely future forecast path and the distribution of forecasts around that path. We show that the models project generally rising infl ation, but, in contrast to other forecasts, fi ve out of six models assign a less than 50 percent probability to infl ation's being 2 percent or higher over the next three years.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Federal Reserve Board. Looking ahead, most forecasts again call for infl ation to rise toward 2 percent. At the September 2016 FOMC meeting, the median projection in the FOMC's Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) for PCE infl ation was 1.9 percent for 2017:Q4 and 2.0 percent for both 2018:Q4 and 2019:Q4. For core PCE, the median projections were 1.8 percent, 2.0 percent, and 2.0 percent, respectively. Projections from the 2016:Q4 SPF were similar, with the median forecasts for PCE infl ation rising from 1.9 percent in 2017:Q4 to 2.0 percent in 2018:Q4, and for core PCE infl ation rising to 1.9 percent in 2017:Q4 and remaining fl at through 2018:Q4.
Comparisons with Statistical Forecasting Models
The infl ation forecasts of economists and policymakers are often informed by statistical models. While there is no agreement on a single "best" model for the infl ation process, we chose for our analysis six statistical models that have been shown to forecast infl ation well over the medium term (i.e., two to three years); this forecasting horizon seems to be the most appropriate for monetary policy.
1
To improve forecasting accuracy, the models we consider include stochastic volatility, or a time-varying standard deviation of the size of the shocks hitting the economy. An increasing body of research has shown that incorporating stochastic volatility into macroeconomic models improves the precision of both point and density forecasts of infl ation.
2
All the models are estimated with quarterly data through 2016:Q3. 3 We run these six models twice: The fi rst run uses PCE infl ation as our infl ation variable, the second uses core PCE infl ation. This allows us to generate an outlook for both of these infl ation indicators.
4
Our fi rst model is the univariate unobserved components model of Stock and Watson (2007) . This model assumes that at any point in time infl ation (headline or core) is the sum of two underlying unobservable components: trend infl ation and temporary fl uctuation around this trend. The trend component follows a random walk process, which varies over time in response to unexpected shocks. The standard deviation of the size of these unexpected shocks is allowed to vary over time. The other component, the temporary deviation from the trend, is assumed to be serially uncorrelated. The standard deviation of the shocks that are responsible for these transitory deviations also varies over time. The model uses infl ation's own history to estimate the two components. The estimated value of the trend component at each point in time is the point forecast of infl ation far into the future, implying a perfectly fl at path for the point forecast. One notable property of this forecasting model is that the estimated trend can be infl uenced by a persistent sequence of observations that the model interprets as resulting from a change in the underlying trend. One period's blip up or down can be perceived as "noise," whereas a sequence of higher infl ation rates can alter the estimate of the trend. We denote this model UCSV.
Our second model is a bivariate unobserved components model as in Chan, Clark, and Koop (2015) . This model is an extension of the Stock and Watson (2007) univariate UCSV model as it uses both infl ation's own history and the data from long-run infl ation expectations to estimate trend infl ation. 5 The model allows for time-variation in the relationship between trend infl ation and the long-run forecast of infl ation in addition to stochastic volatility. We denote this model TVP-Bi-UCSV.
Our third model is the unobserved components model as in Tallman and Zaman (forthcoming) . This model exploits a Phillips-curve relationship that may be relevant for some infl ation subaggregates but not others. Specifi cally, forecasts of aggregate infl ation are produced by separately forecasting services infl ation and goods infl ation, using two different models, and then aggregating the forecasts. 6 The model used to forecast services infl ation is a bivariate unobserved components model that exploits the Phillips curve relationship between services infl ation and the unemployment rate. The model for goods infl ation is a univariate UCSV model as in Stock and Watson (2007) but applied to goods infl ation. We denote this model Services and Goods UCSV. Our fourth model closely follows the model laid out in Clark (2011) . The model is a small-scale vector autoregression estimated using Bayesian methods and a steady-state prior. The model consists of the following four variables: the unemployment rate, real GDP growth, the federal funds rate, and PCE infl ation (or core PCE infl ation).
8 Both the infl ation rate and the unemployment rate enter the model as deviations from their respective trends (i.e., gaps), where the trends are taken from external sources. 9 In this model, the equation for the infl ation gap is a function of its own lags and the lags of other variables including the unemployment gap. The advantage of modeling infl ation this way-that is, as a gap-is that infl ation forecasts in the medium-to longterm remain anchored around the exogenous trend rate. Research has shown that this method helps improve infl ation forecast accuracy. We denote this model SS-SV-BVAR. Our fi fth model is a time-varying parameter vector autoregression as in D' Agostino et al. (2013) . 10 This model has three variables: the unemployment rate, the federal funds rate, and infl ation. As the name suggests, it allows for the possibility of changing relationships among the economic variables of interest over time in addition to changing volatility of the shocks hitting the economy. Infl ation in this model at any point in time is a function of its own lags and the lags of the other variables. We denote this model TVP-SV-BVAR.
Finally, our sixth model is an autoregressive (AR) gap model similar to that of Faust and Wright (2013) but augmented to allow stochastic volatility as detailed in Chan, Clark, and Koop (2015) . Specifi cally, infl ation is modeled as the deviation from long-run infl ation expectations (denoted as the infl ation gap), which is assumed to follow an autoregressive process with a single lag. We denote this model AR1-SV-Gap.
Point Forecasts
Each of these six models is estimated using data through 2016:Q3 and then simulated to obtain thousands of forecast paths up to 13 quarters out in order to match the SEP projection horizon (i.e., from 2016:Q4 to 2019:Q4). 11 The mean of these thousands of forecast paths is denoted as the point forecast; it refl ects the most likely forecast of future infl ation generated by a given model. 12 Table 1 reports the point forecasts for four-quarter trailing infl ation rates at three set of dates from our set of six models. It also reports the simple arithmetic average of the forecasts from the six models. Forecasts from the SPF and the FOMC SEP are provided for comparison. The three representative dates match the forecast dates reported in the SEP and SPF.
The point forecasts for PCE infl ation over the next three years display notable differences across the models. For example, for 2017:Q4 (as well as for 2019:Q4) infl ation projections range anywhere from 1.0 percent to 2.0 percent.
For context, the fi rst three models under consideration belong to the class of models called the "unobserved components" model. In these models, the infl ation forecast is driven mainly by the value of the infl ation trend component estimated at the time the forecast is made. The UCSV model assumes that the "point" forecast of infl ation arbitrarily far into the future is the current estimate of the trend infl ation. Given that infl ation has been relatively low for a while, both the UCSV model and the Services and Goods UCSV model estimate a low level of trend infl ation and hence forecast low future infl ation. In the TVP-Bi-UCSV, the inclusion of infl ation expectations that are stable at 2 percent strongly infl uences the estimate of trend infl ation.
The remaining three models belong to the class of vector autoregressive models (VARs); forecasts from VARs are essentially glide paths that begin from the recent actual value of a variable and converge to these models' own estimates of the variable's (in our case infl ation's) long-run value. 13 In two of the three models, the long-run infl ation rate or trend rate comes from outside the model instead of being estimated, and with that trend currently at 2 percent, these two models return closer to 2 percent in the medium to long term.
14 The forecasts from these three models are all generally higher than those coming from the fi rst three models: 1.7 percent to 2.0 percent for 2017:Q4, 1.8 percent to 2.1 percent for 2018:Q4, and 1.8 percent to 2.0 percent for 2019:Q4. They are also within the range of the FOMC projections reported in the September SEP (see table 1 ).
The forecasting literature has shown that historically these six models have delivered comparable forecast accuracy. Given this competitiveness, all the information in these models' forecasts can be combined and used at the same time by averaging them into a single forecast. When each forecasting model's prediction is equally weighted, the resulting forecast is low-PCE infl ation is projected to be 1.6 percent over the next three years (table 1) . That forecast is about four-tenths lower than the SEP's median projection.
For core PCE infl ation, the models' combined forecast for infl ation is 1.7 percent for the next three years, roughly threetenths lower than the median SEP projection value. Figure 2 presents the point (mean) forecasts of PCE infl ation along with the 70 percent and 90 percent probability bands around them. Figure 3 does the same for core PCE infl ation. The fi gures show the FOMC's long-run infl ation goal of 2 percent to give a visual sense of where it lies in the probability interval. We make three observations. First, each forecast entails considerable uncertainty. Based on data through 2016:Q3, the narrowest forecast probability bands are associated with the TVP-Bi-UCSV model, whereas TVP-SV-BVAR has the widest probability bands.
Density Forecasts and Quantifying the Likelihood of Infl ation Crossing 2 Percent
Second, half of the forecasts for PCE infl ation assign a small probability to the prospect of returning to 2 percent. Among the forecasts from the fi rst three models, the line at 2 percent is either outside or just barely touching the 70 percent probability bands. Forecasts from all three of these models would put the odds of infl ation's being greater than or equal to 2 percent at less than 25 percent (table 2) . 15 However, the remaining three models are somewhat more sanguine about the infl ation outlook. In these cases, the 2 percent line is inside the 70 percent probability band and closer to the point forecast, suggesting a greater likelihood when compared with the forecasts from models one through three that infl ation will exceed or equal 2 percent. The SS-SV-BVAR model forecasts a slightly greater than 50 percent probability that infl ation will be 2 percent or higher, a probability which is consistent with that model's point forecasts of 2.0 percent to 2.1 percent reported in table 1. However, the probabilities in the other two models are less than 50 percent throughout the forecast horizon. Thus, fi ve of the six models considered here place a less than 50 percent probability on PCE infl ation's rising above 2 percent. For core PCE infl ation, all six models place a less than 50 percent probability on such an outcome.
Conclusion
Infl ation has been running at low levels for most of the past fi ve years and has failed to move higher as expected. This Commentary assesses the likelihood that infl ation will increase to at least 2 percent over the next three years by using six forecasting models that research has shown to be accurate for forecasting infl ation. For PCE infl ation, fi ve of the six models suggest that there is a less than 50 percent probability that infl ation will be greater than or equal to 2 percent in the next three years. For core PCE infl ation, all six models currently estimate a less than 50 percent probability that infl ation will be greater than or equal to 2 percent.
In all of our model simulations, there are wide probability bands around the forecasts, indicating a considerable degree of uncertainty. Infl ation in the future could rise above the forecasts, and if the increase were persistent-that is, infl a- 
The Likelihood of Infl ation's Being 2 Percent or Higher
Notes: Infl ation refers to four-quarter trailing infl ation. The numbers reported are percentages (probabilities). tion surprises to the upside-then these infl ation observations would likely alter the forecasts as well as the related likelihoods to the upside.
Footnotes
1. The forecasting superiority of these models is documented in the following recent studies: Clark, 2011; Faust and Wright, 2013; Clark and Doh, 2014, Chan, Clark, and Koop, 2015; and Tallman and Zaman, forthcoming. 2. See Stock and Watson, 2007; Clark, 2011; D'Agostino et al., 2013; and Tallman and Zaman, forthcoming. To get a sense of how forecast uncertainty differs between models with and without time-varying volatility see Knotek et al., 2015 , who look at the evolution of infl ation forecast uncertainty across a variety of models including some with and without time-varying volatility. Three of the models used in this analysis were also used in that study.
3. The start date of the estimation varies by model. We keep the same start date as it was set in the cited studies; see footnote 11 for details. In principle, we could augment the models with infl ation nowcasts for Q4 using the infl ation nowcasting model of Knotek and Zaman (forthcoming) , but given that the models' Q4 forecasts of core infl ation are identical to the nowcasts and similar for PCE infl ation, the models' forecasts would not be changed materially.
4. We model these two infl ation rates separately to be consistent with the cited studies that estimate models using only one infl ation indicator at a time.
5. The long-run infl ation expectations come from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).
6. The forecasts of the two components are combined into the forecast for aggregate infl ation using the real-time component weights available as of the forecast date. The weights are the relative share of services infl ation and goods infl ation in overall PCE infl ation. The weight for services infl ation is computed as the nominal share of personal consumption expenditures of services divided by nominal PCE, and the weight for goods infl ation is one minus the services' share. As of 2016:Q3, goods infl ation was assigned a weight of 32 percent and services infl ation 68 percent; similarly, core goods' share was 26 percent and core services' share 74 percent.
7. Specifi cally, goods infl ation is decomposed into a random walk trend component and serially uncorrelated transitory component, both of whose variances are allowed to vary over time.
8. For this analysis, we imposed the following steady states: real GDP growth of 2.0 percent; nominal federal funds rate of 3.25 percent; infl ation of 2.0 percent; and an unemployment rate of 5.0 percent.
9. Specifi cally, the unemployment rate trend comes from the natural rate series available from the Congressional Budget Offi ce (CBO), and the infl ation trend comes from the longrun infl ation expectations from the Federal Reserve Board's econometric model. This series is nicknamed "PTR." It is a construct based on estimates from Kozicki and Tinsley (2001) and 10-year forecasts from the SPF.
10. This time-varying parameter model was originally developed by Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2005) . D' Agostino et al. (2013) use this model to document its superior forecasting capability especially for infl ation against a constant parameter BVAR and other univariate benchmarks.
11. The UCSV, TVP-Bi-UCSV, and AR1-SV-Gap are estimated with data beginning 1959:Q2; the Services and Goods UCSV is estimated with data beginning 1960:Q1; the SS-SV-BVAR is estimated with data beginning 1985:Q1; and TVP-SV-BVAR is estimated with data beginning 1959:Q2, with the fi rst 10 years used as the training sample for determining the priors.
12. The simulated paths refl ect both shock and parameter uncertainty. Parameter uncertainty is accounted for by drawing different a set of parameters for each simulated path. Shock uncertainty is refl ected by drawing a set of shocks specifi c to the model's estimation of historical data.
13. The estimated (unrestricted) long-run values for the variables in the VAR are the unconditional sample mean of the variable. Therefore, the model's estimated long-run value will depend on the sample period used for estimation. In our steady-state BVAR, a long-run value for infl ation of 2 percent is imposed; as a result, this model goes toward 2 percent very quickly. This model is called a steady-state BVAR because we could choose to impose long-run values on any or all of the variables that comprise it.
14. The models do not necessarily converge precisely to 2 percent because the presence of a constant term in the infl ation gap equation captures the long-run historical deviation of the infl ation gap from zero within the estimation sample. The estimated value of the constant term will be positive if infl ation has exceeded the infl ation trend on average during the sample, while it will be negative if infl ation has been below trend on average.
15. These likelihoods refl ect the probability, computed as the fraction of the simulations, that infl ation is greater than or equal to 2 percent at those specifi c dates.
